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Abstract

This paper intends to explore the past representations of Vercingetorix and the Gauls as defined by Julius
Caesar and connect them to significant French events throughout the long nineteenth and twentieth
centuries in order to establish a link between the Gauls, French nationalism, and French identity.
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Introduction
Throughout history there have been a number of notable figures who have left a
palpable legacy behind. Without even mentioning a name, perhaps one of them has
already come to mind. Their acts, whether for better or worse, have left a mark on the
culture of the world as we know it. But what of those people who went under history’s
radar for a time? What happens when they are rediscovered? The interpretations of their
legacies often find their place on the world’s stage. One such example would be that of
Vercingetorix.
A Gallic chieftain of the 1st century BCE, Vercingetorix is best known for his
failed revolt against the forces of Rome led by Julius Caesar. Unlike most famous
historical figures, this is the relative extent of what is known about him and his life. Due
to this, Vercingetorix was largely overlooked for many centuries by those who would
have normally taken on his historical legacy. However, he was pulled back out from
obscurity in the late 18th and early 19th centuries in order to do just that; establish a
historical legacy.
In the hands of intellectuals inspired by Napoleon Bonaparte, the figure and
heritage of Vercingetorix quickly became a staple of budding French nationalism. As the
many states of Europe vied for influence and power in the long nineteenth century, the
French became especially enamored with their past. Functioning as a tool of political
justification, public morale, and national pride all at once, Vercingetorix and his Gallic
heritage bolstered the foundations of French nationalism even as his legend grew
alongside it.
As the 19th century moved along, Napoleon III was not one to avoid an
opportunity so easily given. He expanded on the traditions of archaeology, bankrolling
dig sites across France that would anchor the legend (and the subsequent political
ramifications) to the country’s soil. These samples of physical evidence, coupled with a
sudden explosion of relevant paintings, literary pieces, and sculptures placed in key
locations, helped to forge a deeper, more personal connection between the French people
and the Gauls.
The unspoken battle of cultural identification was thus won for the French.
Despite the people’s acceptance of the necessity of Roman conquest and civilization, the
Gallic defenders won over the hearts of the modern plebs. However, this connection of
the French to Gallic culture was not just cemented by art and archaeology. Perhaps most
strongly, it was made possible through a personal affinity felt towards the Gauls. This
affinity was found in the one realm Vercingetorix was most widely known for: defeat.
After the War of 1870 left France devastated morally, it was much easier for the populace
to empathize with their defeated Gallic ancestors. The ideals of pride and resistance even
when faced with overwhelming odds became ingrained in the national French psyche.
When defeated themselves, Vercingetorix and the Gauls suddenly became much more
relatable heroes.
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Even as the War of 1870 ended, its effects lingered and festered. Revanchism rose
in popularity throughout France, as they began to view the Germans and Italians as not
just their modern rivals, but their foes since antiquity. Associations of the Italians with
the Romans and the Germans with Ariovistus and the various Germanic tribes grew. As
World War I and World War II began, these feelings only intensified themselves in the
national French consciousness. Likewise, Gallic national pride was recognizable in both
wars. Associations of French soldiers to Gauls during World War I were commonplace,
even as the winged helmets carved in their graves were perhaps more easily recognizable.
In another fashion, it would be hard to imagine French resistance fighters in World War
II not looking back with pride to their Gallic tradition of stubborn resistance to foreign
occupation.
French nationalism grew alongside its ethnic associations to the Gauls.
Throughout the rest of the 20th century, French culture completed its assimilation of the
Gauls. After passing through the forges of war, both national and personal identification
of the French with their Gallic ancestors was assured. As the Gallic national image
entered into modernity, it was modified to fit into the new soft power politicking of the
era: media. Gallic names and symbols were plastered onto the sides of products and
buildings, fulfilling the same purpose as the statues of Vercingetorix that had been placed
in town squares. Asterix swept the Francophone world by storm, becoming an
international figure as recognizable as Mickey Mouse.
Indeed, the political influence that France gained from Vercingetorix and the
Gauls was not limited to the French mainland. Their legacy has been used by both the
French and their colonies as evidence for and against French hegemony. Perhaps one of
the most interesting of these examples has to do with Abd-El-Kader of Algeria and
comparisons both positive and negative between him and Vercingetorix. Nonetheless, as
literature and popular media continued the legacy of the 19th century Gauls in populating
France and its colonies with Gallic culture, archaeology was not to be left behind. In
2012, a new museum was opened on the site of Vercingetorix’s defeat, Alésia. This
museum shows that the French government is still in the business of constructing and
glorifying a nationalistic cultural identity for its people even today.
Vercingetorix is a complicated figure in French history. The only information
available on his life was written by his opponent and comes with its own complexities
and shortcomings. After years of obscurity, Vercingetorix was reborn by French leaders
as a political morale booster, and a focus figure for national pride. Throughout the long
nineteenth century and into the World Wars, Vercingetorix and his ideals were absorbed
into the French zeitgeist, and in no small part have helped to form their modern cultural
identity. French leaders consistently presented him and the Gauls in such a way that they
eventually became national icons of lasting pride. Vercingetorix has been the most
significant symbol in the development of modern French nationalism and identity.
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Chapter 1
Vercingetorix’s history is intertwined with that of another figure who has also
been utilized as a symbol throughout the 19th and 20th centuries: Julius Caesar. In fact,
nearly all of our knowledge on Vercingetorix comes from Caesar’s De Bello Gallico, or
The Gallic War. The fact that our understanding of Vercingetorix is derived entirely from
the perspective of his adversary presents a number of issues. The largest of these is that
the line between fact and fiction itself becomes blurred. Through his retelling of historical
events, Caesar becomes the first figure to twist the image of Vercingetorix to his own
end.
In order to understand why Caesar would misrepresent certain events in the first
place, one must appreciate the reasoning behind his actions. During the time period of
The Gallic War, Caesar was the governor of the Roman provinces of Cisalpine Gaul,
Illyricum, and Transalpine Gaul. These provinces were “a massive fief and the perfect
springboard for expansion and personal enrichment.” 1 Besides being economically
significant, they were also important militarily, as they essentially consisted of the
overland entrance into central Italy, and the city of Rome itself. These significant
provinces were surrounded by unconquered lands, and ‘barbarian allies.’ As such, “any
threat to the province would be taken very seriously indeed and it would be just such a
perceived threat that would provide Caesar with his pretext for war in 58 BC.” 2 Caesar
thus began his campaigns against the Germanic and Gallic tribes in the region.
Throughout his political career, Caesar had also made a number of powerful
enemies, in positions of power much like his own. Caesar’s campaigns in Gaul were
undoubtedly influenced by the fact that Caesar needed to boost his popular image and his
political influence. Indeed, in The Gallic War’s eighth book, written by Aulus Hirtius
rather than Caesar, Hirtius states how Caesar’s influence did not discourage these
enemies, but rather made them “aware of the need for more favourable circumstances in
which the Senate could be forced to give its approval to their decisions.” 3 In order to
ensure that his enemies never had a favorable opportunity, Caesar needed to continually
present victories and spoils of war back to the people of Rome. While Caesar often
justified the Gallic wars as “being more of a preemptive or defensive action,” it is not
very difficult to see them as being “fought primarily to boost Caesar’s political career and
to pay off his more insistent creditors.” 4 Caesar knew that his biggest source of support in
Rome consisted of the plebeians, the common Roman people. In order to keep himself in
positive political standing with the plebs, to justify his military actions to the Senate, and
to indirectly boast of his victories, Caesar wrote the commentaries that make up The
Gallic War.
John Sadler and Rosie Serdiville, Caesar’s Greatest Victory: The Battle of Alesia, 52 BC (Oxford and
Philadelphia: Casemate Publishers, 2016), 84.
2
Sadler and Serdiville, Caesar’s Greatest Victory, 40.
3
Julius Caesar, The Gallic War, trans. Carolyn Hammond (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 222.
4
Sadler and Serdiville, Caesar’s Greatest Victory, 5.
1

Page |4

Unfortunately for historians (and Vercingetorix), Caesar did not need to report
everything back accurately. The plebs were essentially “a popular ‘dime novel’
audience,” who were not “interested in detailed topographical descriptions. His readers
wanted action, drama, and deeds of glory.” 5 An excellent example of this is Caesar’s
crossing of the Rhine and invasion of Britain in the same summer. 6 While his rivals were
still in Rome and had all of the political influence that followed, Caesar was able to make
“some spectacular PR of his own…[turning] Germany and Britain into his stage.” 7 In the
end, the “whole show, rather pointless as it was in strategic terms…caught imaginations
in Rome and [Caesar] was awarded twenty days of thanksgiving.” 8 This would be the
second summer in which the Senate awarded Caesar thanksgiving, the first fifteen days of
thanksgiving two summers prior having “never been granted to anyone before.” 9 It is not
much of a stretch to imagine that the plebs were pleased with Caesar’s performance, and
especially the festival that followed.
Caesar was performing a delicate balancing act with his campaigns in Gaul. He
needed to retain the popular support he enjoyed in Rome while also maintaining his
military dominance of his conquests. Caesar was essentially “fighting on two fronts, only
one in Gaul, the other, just as deadly, in Rome. A constant string of victories and rewards
were needed from one to keep the other quiescent.” 10 Caesar himself is aware of the
tightrope that he is constantly walking by pressing his luck in Gaul. In his written reports,
“self-justification is a major theme,” 11 “often put into the mouths of others, a method
typical of Caesar---from which he can pick and choose as he likes.” 12 Creating
justification for his actions was one of the most important factors for Caesar, enabling
him to continue walking the tightrope in the first place. As his campaigns resolved and
his opponents in Gaul submitted, Caesar risked losing his entire momentum. Without an
opponent, he would lose his excuses for maintaining such a large army and exerting what
influence he had on Pompey and the Senate. Fortunately, an excellent opportunity arises,
as Vercingetorix emerges onto the stage.
Vercingetorix’s revolt becomes the perfect tool for Caesar to tie off his series of
campaigns with a bang. At the moment, Caesar “was campaigning beyond any remit he
might have enjoyed at the outset. The longer the war dragged on, the more his enemies
would focus.” 13 Caesar was already a target of envy 14 and fear in the Senate, and his
growing military reputation and the loyalty of his legions only served to increase this
feeling among his adversaries. Caesar needed a devastating victory to close the
Ibid, 2.
Caesar, The Gallic War, 77-88.
7
Sadler and Serdiville, Caesar’s Greatest Victory, 90-91.
8
Ibid, 91.
9
Caesar, The Gallic War, 53.
10
Sadler and Serdiville, Caesar’s Greatest Victory, 90.
11
Ibid, 87.
12
Ibid, 165.
13
Ibid, 90.
14
Caesar, The Gallic War, 222.
5
6
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campaigns in Gaul for good and ensure the arrival of the political and economic prizes he
had endeavored to build across his previous years of conquest. In order to build towards
this victory, Caesar needed to present an appropriately challenging opponent for his
audience in Rome. It was common practice that “Roman literature [would magnify] the
person and power of significant enemies so as to magnify the Roman victories over them:
so Sallust on Jugurtha, Horace on Cleopatra, Livy on Hannibal, Tacitus on
Arminius…That modality is certainly operative here: the more Vercingetorix resembles
Caesar, the more difficult and hence glorious Caesar’s victory will seem.” 15 Defeating
another tribe of savages wouldn’t win him recognition. In order to receive greater
acknowledgement from his Roman audience, Caesar had to present Vercingetorix as a
worthy opponent.
To defer for a moment, some context on the Gauls is necessary. First of all, an
important fact to remember throughout The Gallic War is that “Gaul…was not a
homogenous state in any nationalist sense. No Gallic leaders would have viewed
themselves as part of a distinct cultural and geographical entity…Gaul was merely a
geographical expression.” 16 Despite some cultural similarities, there was no grand
overarching identification of the Gallic tribes with one another. Caesar had alliances with
some of the tribes that bordered or lived in the provinces that he governed. Eventually, he
justified invasions and subjugations of other tribes on the basis of their threatening the
tribes he had allied himself with. There was no love lost between the different groups
living in Gaul. Gallic tribes in the area were only unique in that they were not the “more
distinctly Germanic peoples to the east.” 17 It is also notable that there “was never any
attempt at political cohesion” in the first place, “at least not until Vercingetorix.” 18
It is thus surprising that Vercingetorix is presented as having so much weight
among the Gallic tribes out of nowhere. The significance of Caesar acknowledging
Vercingetorix and deeming this as information necessary to record in his journals only at
this specific point is quite telling. The fact that Caesar neglects to mention Vercingetorix
before his revolt is misleading, and out of line with Caesar’s tradition in The Gallic War
of giving extensive context. This is especially important given the fact that Vercingetorix
is immediately “proclaimed king by his supporters” 19 and that “the supreme command
was conferred onto him with unanimous approval.” 20 This implies that Vercingetorix had
already been a significant figure in the Gallic tribes who had been given the time to gain
support. That Vercingetorix manages to make alliances with so many of the different
Gallic tribes, 21 despite there being a lack of cohesion between them beforehand is
Christina S Kraus, “Divide and conquer: Caesar, De bello gallico 7,” in Ancient Historiography and its
Contexts: Studies in Honour of A. J. Woodman, (Oxford Scholarship Online, 2010), 58.
16
Sadler and Serdiville, Caesar’s Greatest Victory, 84.
17
Sadler and Serdiville, Caesar’s Greatest Victory, 84.
18
Ibid, 38.
19
Caesar, The Gallic War, 143.
20
Ibid, 146.
21
Ibid, 146.
15
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especially noteworthy. Even throughout the fighting, when Vercingetorix calls for
changes in strategy from his supporters, he constantly gains their “unanimous support.” 22
Even when Vercingetorix is defeated at Avaricum, he is able to speak to his supporters in
defense of his actions, which “found favor with the Gauls.” 23 The Gallic tribes saw
“foresight and perspicacity” in Vercingetorix’s defensive speech, which then, “although
defeat diminishes the authority of other commanders,” saw “the prestige of Vercingetorix
[growing] daily.” 24 What must be remembered however, is that the relaying of this
speech is done by Vercingetorix’s enemy. Caesar, “as ever…tells us what he thinks his
audience wants to hear and only that which shows him in a favourable light.” 25 This
rhetorical tool was commonly used and accepted in ancient times. Exact quotations were
unlikely to occur, and the relator was often reliable enough to not be questioned.
However, while this rhetorical tool may have been innocently used by Thucydides and
others to create a compelling narrative, it is used by Caesar to instead build up
Vercingetorix into what he needed him to be. If questioned, Thucydides’ own statement
on the matter could be used in Caesar’s defense, stating that “my habit has been to make
the speakers say what was in my opinion demanded of them by the various occasions, of
course adhering as closely as possible to the general sense of what they really said.” 26
After all, what better way to bolster the reputation of an enemy than by showing the
wisdom of their speeches (which cannot be proved to have happened anyway)?
In The Gallic War, Caesar initially gives Vercingetorix a brief background as the
son of a warmonger but makes the statement that Vercingetorix was “a young man whose
abilities were second to none.” 27 Throughout the rest of the book, Caesar “does not admit
to knowing Vercingetorix or suggest they ever met until the very end,” even though it “is
tempting to think he is being disingenuous and that they had certainly crossed paths.” 28
While every little chieftain’s son may have had some form of local support or prestige,
not all of them began a revolt against Rome. Vercingetorix is portrayed by Caesar as
having “[erupted] from virtual obscurity onto the stage as a major player…of
considerable talent,” 29 who is already on par with Caesar’s own military experience. The
arrival of a unifier in the enemies’ ranks out of nowhere, just when their defeat seems
inevitable, is an inept but nonetheless common literary strategy when one has already
defeated all other contenders.
Vercingetorix, whether by his own merit, or through the literary magnification he
is given from Caesar, is immediately recognized in The Gallic War as a rival to Caesar in
Gaul. Now the question becomes, to what extent is Caesar magnifying Vercingetorix’s
Ibid, 151.
Ibid, 160.
24
Ibid, 160.
25
Sadler and Serdiville, Caesar’s Greatest Victory, 94-95.
26
Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, London, J.M. Dent; New York, E.P. Dutton. (1910), 1.22.
http://data.perseus.org/citations/urn:cts:greekLit:tlg0003.tlg001.perseus-eng3:1.22.
27
Caesar, The Gallic War, 143.
28
Sadler and Serdiville, Caesar’s Greatest Victory, 95.
29
Ibid, 95.
22
23
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prowess in order to present a worthy rival to Rome. To what degree does Caesar wish to
bolster his rival? On these grounds, one could question the inclusion of Caesar’s defeat at
Gergovia, which “he could have easily presented as a minor skirmish at an unknown
oppidum, or indeed left out altogether.” 30 However, this inclusion speaks to Caesar’s
literary expertise, and the narrative that he is fastidiously crafting, where “a defeat in the
middle of the book sets up and acts as a foil to the greater victory at the end.” 31 A
struggle, whether real or fictional, always adds to the drama of the story, and pulls the
reader in. Caesar shows his experience throughout The Gallic War as “a first story-teller.
He knew his audience and his measured account, always in the third person, is dryly
under-stated, the boasting discreet and inferred.” 32 Every word in The Gallic War is
purposefully placed by Caesar in order to build up his construction of the Gauls and of
Vercingetorix as a worthy enemy, refraining from “[disparaging] or [demeaning] the
enemy” while still giving “credit to his men.” 33
The inclusion of Caesar’s defeat at Gergovia pushes the danger presented by the
Gauls into the forefront of the reader’s mind. The ante would be raised for any citizen
back in Rome by a considerable amount, considering how the Gauls were “generally
perceived as barbarians, viewed with a mix of fear, grudging fascination and contempt.
Nonetheless, it was these same unkempt savages who had occupied Rome in 390 BC and
humiliated the Republic.” 34 Caesar, as usual, understands the implications his defeat
would invoke. Because of this, he then puts the same realization into Vercingetorix’s
words, where the chieftain tells his supporters that “the fact that the Romans were
running away to the Province and leaving Gaul…was insufficient to secure peace and
tranquility permanently. The Romans would surely gather a larger force and return to
prolong the war indefinitely.” 35 Too often, it seems like Caesar is playing chess against
himself in De Bello Gallico, putting words into the mouth of his enemy and then
anticipating his own constructed counters, all in twenty-twenty vision. The speeches that
Caesar writes, both for himself and for others, thus “function on the level of the narrator
and his narratees.” 36 Whenever Caesar presents the ‘thoughts’ of a character, they are his
own construction, “a literary tool put to use in Caesar’s commentaries to persuade the
narratees that war, and battles within war, are predictable and controllable procedures.” 37
Procedures which, of course, Caesar anticipates and comes out on top of.
Caesar defends his reputation of military prescience through the battle of
Gergovia. To realize this, one must recognize the similarities between his pre-battle
Kraus, “Divide and conquer,” 58.
Ibid, 58.
32
Sadler and Serdiville, Caesar’s Greatest Victory, 2.
33
Ibid, 2.
34
Ibid, 38.
35
Caesar, The Gallic War, 180.
36
Suzanne M. Adema, “Encouraging Troops, Persuading Narratees: Pre-Battle Exhortations in Caesar’s
Bellum Gallicum as a Narrative Device,” in The Art of History. Literary Perspectives on Greek and Roman
Historiography, ed. V. Liotsakis and S. Farrrington (Berlin, 2016), 236.
37
Adema, “Encouraging Troops, Persuading Narratees,” 236-237.
30
31
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exhortation and the results of the battle that Caesar deems necessary to record. In his
speech to his troops before the fighting begins, Caesar states that the legates must “keep
their soldiers under control and prevent them advancing too far…this was a moment for
seizing an opportunity, not fighting a full-scale battle.” 38 As the fighting occurs, the
Roman’s fateful defeat at Gergovia seems set in stone through Caesar’s inclusion of a
specific set of anecdotes. The first about a centurion who was too foolhardy, and the
other about a centurion who managed to save his men by sacrificing himself, after also
pushing too far forward. 39 Through his miraculous ‘foresight’, Caesar is able to shift the
blame onto his men, given that those very things he warned them about occurred. 40
Indeed, the aftermath of the battle of Gergovia leaves “forty-six centurions [dead], along
with seven hundred ORs. These are the casualties Caesar admits to but we must wonder if
they were, in fact, much worse.” 41 Perhaps more importantly than his physical losses
however, is the fact that “Vercingetorix had beaten Caesar. And while Caesar might win
a hundred battles, he could not afford a single defeat. Compared to the ferocity of his
enemies in Rome, the Gauls were almost benign.” 42 Caesar knew that his enemies in the
Senate would be more than eager to capitalize on any weakness he allowed to occur. In
response to his defeat at Vercingetorix’s hands, the “next day Caesar paraded his men
and harangued them over their recklessness the day before. Ramming home the point, he
blamed the fiasco on their negligence rather than his. How convincing this performance
sounded, he wisely doesn’t say.” 43 Caesar, through the battle of Gergovia, is able to
address two issues at once. First, he manages to lessen the negative feedback from Rome
regarding his defeat by pushing the blame onto his soldier’s recklessness. Second, he is
able to put the defeat to use, utilizing it to strengthen the reputation and threat presented
by his rival, Vercingetorix. The Gauls emerged victorious, proving to themselves and the
reader that they are able to best the legions of Rome if Caesar’s orders are not followed.
In a somewhat interesting parallel, Vercingetorix’s only personal appearance during the
battle involves him pulling his troops back from pursuing Caesar’s legions, putting
Caesar’s own unfollowed advice to use. 44 This strengthens the similarity that Caesar
attempts to build between the two leaders, praising Vercingetorix’s military intelligence
to a degree, but being sure to make it obvious that the orders Vercingetorix issued were
the same ones Caesar had attempted to command earlier.
In this specific instance, and elsewhere in The Gallic War, Caesar often plays
both sides of an issue. Throughout his reports Caesar likes to stress both the similarities
and differences the Gauls have to the Romans. Once again he calls attention to, and finds
advantages from, both sides by using his literary skill. To begin this line of thought, one
must understand that Caesar, “had difficulty in seeing alien cultural norms in their own
Caesar, The Gallic War, 169.
Ibid, 170-172.
40
Adema, “Encouraging Troops, Persuading Narratees,” 233.
41
Sadler and Serdiville, Caesar’s Greatest Victory, 116.
42
Ibid, 116.
43
Ibid, 116.
44
Caesar, The Gallic War, 172.
38
39
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terms.” 45 Throughout his retelling of his conquests, Caesar is not interested “in an
objective, stand-alone assessment of the Northerners on scientific terms” or as “a device
for analyzing the Romans themselves. Caesar the general and politician has a much more
immediate goal in mind. He needs a somewhat level playing-field so that he can be
compared to those he is defeating.” 46 He is solely concerned with the native population
through their capacity to add on to his constructions. Thus, in order to maintain the
reputation he has built up throughout his campaigns in Gaul, Caesar decides to develop
certain positive and negative comparisons for the Gallic tribes in his writings. Positives in
order to raise their reputation and his own by default when he wins, and negatives so that
the violence against them is justified.
Through his comparisons, Caesar writes back to Rome with an image of the Gauls
as uncivilized, bloodthirsty savages, and yet still an intelligent enough people to fight on
equal terms with Caesar. With Vercingetorix’s emergence, there is an excellent example
of this. The first paragraph explaining Vercingetorix’s actions after coming to power
states that after he formed alliances with many of the other tribes, he:
demanded hostages from all these peoples, and ordered them to send him a
specified number of soldiers at once. He decreed that each state must produce a
given number of weapons before a certain date, and paid particular attention to the
cavalry. In his command he combined extreme conscientiousness with extreme
severity. He used harsh punishments to bring waverers into line. For the more
serious offences, death was inflicted by burning and all kinds of torture, while for
lesser faults the offender’s ears were cut off or one of his eyes gouged out. He
was then sent home as an example to others, to strike fear into them by the
severity of the punishment. By such penalties as these Vercingetorix quickly
gathered an army. 47
Despite the cruel nature of the punishments, Caesar is sure to point out the effectiveness
of Vercingetorix’s methods on his own people. The ‘harsh’ punishments of the Gauls do
not even seem to be necessarily extreme for the time period, when one considers that the
Roman army had the tradition of decimation (systematic execution of every tenth
member of a cohort). Nonetheless, Caesar doesn’t neglect to include Vercingetorix’s
military competence, demonstrated through his insistence on the production of weapons
and especially cavalry, a valuable and important feature in armies of the time. So, in the
same paragraph, Caesar is once again able to present two sides of his opposition: that of
violent savage, and that of competent warrior.
The inclusion of comparisons between the Gauls and the Romans is especially
important to Caesar’s construction. Throughout The Gallic War, “digressions on the
characteristics of the Gauls and Germans are essential to Caesar’s account. They justify
Sadler and Serdiville, Caesar’s Greatest Victory, 43.
Andrew Riggsby, “In a Different Voice? Speech and Agency in de Bello Gallico” colloquium on
“Representations of the Alien,” Getty Villa, Mar. 2008; University of Georgia, July 2012, 20-21.
47
Caesar, The Gallic War, 146.
45
46
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his conquests by encouraging the reader to draw comparisons between Roman ideals of
nationhood and the ways of these foreign nations…They are less developed than the
civilized Romans: they make human sacrifices; they treat the common people like slaves;
they do not have democracy.” 48 All of these things are essential to the construction that
Caesar is trying to create. For Roman readers, the Gauls were neighbors and ancestral
enemies. While they were seen as backwards in certain ways, they were nonetheless more
‘civilized’ to Romans than other neighboring peoples and were able to successfully
engage in diplomacy. However, the possibility of a civilized rival is more threatening
than that of a barbarian neighbor that can be parleyed with only in terms of violence.
Inevitably, Caesar must push the image of the Gauls as barbarians, given that it has been
his ally throughout his campaigns:
Caesar presents real or imagined threats to explain away his intervention in Gaul.
For example, Caesar claims that the Helvetii threaten the Roman province and
promote anti-Roman sentiment. Four times he recalls their annihilation of the
Roman army of L. Cassius Longinus in 107 BCE. Also his reports always portray
the enemy as the aggressor, even when his troops plunder Gallic lands or he sells
a population into slavery. Caesar compares and contrasts the civilized ways of
Rome to the barbarism of those he conquers. He portrays the Gauls as deserving
to be subjugated because they lack Roman qualities. They are fickle and
undetermined, rash and frenzied, greedy and lazy. Caesar’s men defend their
nation with discipline, hard work, and traditional virtue. 49
Caesar consistently utilizes the perceived threat of the Gauls as justification for his
military endeavours. The comparison of the Romans to the Gauls mentioned here shows
how Caesar strives to portray his men in a better light than their enemies. Since his
construction is our only source of the events relayed, “there is no ‘outside-thetext’…Caesar creates both the speeches and the action in narrative…Caesar is not
constrained by the actual identity of…Vercingetorix. This allows Caesar to make the
Gauls complicit in the judgement of themselves.” 50 When he decides to let Vercingetorix
or other Gallic leaders speak, they are doing so under his literary influence, and are thus
being molded to Caesar’s purpose. In this way, he is able to portray them under a certain
negative light when the words and actions he has them perform “fail to live up to
whatever standards Caesar chooses to set for them.” 51 While he gives the enemy leader
recognition and acknowledgement through speech, Caesar is still able to derail their
image at the same time.
Caesar is not so modest as to neglect including his own self in these comparisons.
While he must throughout be “the disinterested servant of the populus Romanus,” 52 the
Sadler and Serdiville, Caesar’s Greatest Victory, 101.
Alex Nice, “Caesar, Julius. Commentaries on the Gallic War,” in Classical Literature and Its Times, ed. J.
Moss (Los Angeles: Moss Publishing, 2006), 100-101.
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purpose of Caesar’s writing of The Gallic War in the first place is to bolster his prestige
in Rome. As the author, therefore:
Despite the use of the third person for his account, Caesar himself is ever present.
Often he appears suddenly and dramatically: to save the Seventh Legion in
Britain, to rescue Quintus Cicero, at the forefront of the battle, robed in his
general’s red cloak at the siege of Alesia. As appropriate, Caesar metes out
pardon or punishment. He takes care to mention individual officers, centurions,
and even slaves. In the account and through the account, Caesar emerges as a
model of Roman virtue par excellence. He is the diplomat, general, warrior… He
encourages his Roman audience to believe in his actions and in himself. 53
One must again remember that the writings of The Gallic War were being sent back to
Rome for the public and the Senate to be updated on his campaigns. What better way to
build up recognition than by presenting heroic and notable images of yourself to your
supporters? Once again, Caesar’s construction is built up on the basis of two somewhat
conflicting factors. First being his purposeful humility, shown by how he “famously
never speaks directly” 54. Second, that he is still involved in the forefront of the action,
where “even if Caesar is not physically present, his gaze must be internalized.” 55 In this
way, he presents a humble image of self-removal from direct praise, but is still indirectly
linked to any instance deserving of recognition.
In comparison to Caesar, the reader is constantly presented with the parallel of
Vercingetorix. In his own way, “Vercingetorix is the Gallic equivalent of Caesar: a
capable orator, strategist, and warrior.” 56 Even though Caesar presents himself as being
one step ahead of Vercingetorix throughout his writings, 57 Caesar consistently notes
Vercingetorix’s “tactical genius,” which “clearly shows him to be a young man of high
intelligence, strategic nous and exceptional dynamism.” 58 While Vercingetorix is clearly
magnified by Caesar at certain points, there is still quite a bit of importance aligned with
his person that Caesar is unable to diminish or alter. Chief among these is his prominence
within the Gallic tribes. Given that “Vercingetorix was always at pains to stress he was
acting for the greater good rather than from personal ambition, an ostensible humility
Caesar records,” 59 it is unsurprising that he benefits from the faith of his supporters. The
relief force sent to Vercingetorix when he was trapped at Alesia is proof enough of this.
Indeed, “the accumulation of the relief amounts to a unique and monumental effort and
speaks volumes about Vercingetorix’ prestige. No leader before could call into being
such a colossal effort. The idea of a national levée en masse doesn’t really recur till the
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darks days after the Revolution of 1789.” 60 The amount of people rallying to his aid
certainly puts evidence behind Vercingetorix’s cultural prominence. Caesar understands
this as well, given that he “is tantalisingly brief in describing this great relief army. He
gives us tribes and numbers but nothing else…it is frustrating that Caesar doesn’t explain
more, but of course his commentary isn’t about the Gauls, it’s all about him.” 61 It returns
again in the end to Caesar’s presentation of events. To his supporters back in Rome, all
that matters is that Caesar comes up victorious, even against the huge numbers practically
all Gaul raises against him at Alesia. The comparison between them ends with
Vercingetorix’s surrender at Alesia. In his final historical act, Vercingetorix is used once
again by Caesar in order to fuel his purposes. Presenting proof of the events of The Gallic
War to his readers, Vercingetorix’s “captivity lasted for six dismal years till he made his
final public appearance as star exhibit in one of Caesar’s triumphal shows. That
complete, he was quietly strangled in the Tullianum jail.” 62 Vercingetorix had completed
his role in Caesar’s construction.
The image of Vercingetorix is utilized by Caesar to present a worthy adversary to
the Roman people. Through his writings in The Gallic War, Caesar portrays
Vercingetorix and the Gauls as noble savages, barbarians threatening Rome who retain
enough civilization to rally and face the Romans with skill on the battlefield. The issues
that arise for historians involve the number of facts that Caesar presents which are
problematic. First, that the Gauls are barbarian threats to Roman provinces. Second, that
Vercingetorix emerged and managed to rally an entire people (who had never before
created a major alliance) behind him within a summer, with no prior support. Third, that
Caesar managed to defeat a force many times larger than his own at Alesia. These facts
are modified by Caesar in order to paint the picture he wanted his rivals in Rome to see.
The Gauls being a threat to the province justifies his campaigning and his standing
legions. The emergence of Vercingetorix as a significant rival justifies his large-scale
campaign which ends in his pacification of Gaul. His victory at Alesia paves the way for
the Romanization of the region. Through Caesar and The Gallic War, Vercingetorix is
first presented as a significant roadblock, but a roadblock which manages to hold against
the might of Rome through the tenacity and support of his people.

Chapter 2
Roman Gaul was broken and reforged multiple times during the time between the
fall of the Roman Empire and the beginning of the Middle Ages. The monarchy of France
was eventually established with a clear connection calling on the family line of Clovis.
Thus, the legacy of Vercingetorix and the Gauls became overshadowed due to the
Franks’ popularity with French royalty. Eventually, through his connection to Caesar,
Vercingetorix and the Gauls found themselves the subject of new fascination and
controversy in the beginning of the long nineteenth century, around 1,800 years after the
Ibid, 142.
Ibid, 142.
62
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conclusion of the Gallic Wars. But in much the same manner as before, Vercingetorix
was brought to light by Napoleon III in order to serve as a symbol with a purpose, not
just as historical fact. He intended to forge Vercingetorix into a national symbol, one
associated with his own rule, which would bolster national pride and encourage the idea
of a common French origin. While Napoleon III found himself unable to harvest the fruit
of his labors, the idea of a common Gallic ancestry, Vercingetorix’s presence and his new
symbolic meaning would find themselves embedded into the minds of the people.
To begin describing Vercingetorix’s re-emergence, it is necessary to make note of
the various minor ways his existence was noted in France before he found himself in the
hands of Napoleon III. The person who would begin this process of reintroducing
Vercingetorix to the national consciousness was a prosecutor of the Paris Parliament,
Jean Villevault. A supporter of local patriotism, he wrote a work on Vercingetorix
because of his legendary victory over Caesar at Gergovia, Villevault’s modern hometown
of Clermont-Ferrand. 63 Written in 1589, the book inspired further praise from other
writers in the area, until it eventually attracted royal attention. Most likely born out of a
desire to garner royal favor, Vercingetorix’s first usage after hundreds of years consisted
of a book written by a jurist named Jacques Cassan, who attempted to connect Caesar’s
“mythical genealogy” 64 of the Gauls to the royal line of Louis XIII. A textbook example
of the royalty connecting themselves, falsely or not, to the ancestry of the land,
Vercingetorix’s family reunion was unfortunately cut short due to one fact; he was pagan.
Clovis, the current patron of the royal family, was “the origin of Christian France, of
France eldest daughter of the Church, of the monarchy invested with power through that
same God.” 65 Vercingetorix’s inclusion was unnecessary and likely troublesome to
aristocratic, Christian France. However, the perfect chance was waiting just around the
corner.
The French Revolution and its subsequent ideological shifts opened the doors to
yet another re-evaluation of Vercingetorix’s legacy. First, and perhaps worst, there was
some justification implied in the comparison between Vercingetorix’s scorched earth
policy against Caesar and the Terror of 1793. 66 Vercingetorix had committed all of his
Gallic allies to a scorched earth policy, devastating the countryside as they retreated,
denying Caesar’s troops any possibility of foraged supplies or shelter. 67 The proponents
of the French Revolution believed that the violence of the Terror was a necessary
sacrifice in the same manner, in order to see the realization of their ideals. Perhaps the
most problematic comparison of all, it certainly remains the most striking. Comparing the
[son œuvre relève du patriotisme local car il est clermontois] André Simon, Vercingétorix et l’idéologie
Française, self-translated (Paris: Éditions Imago, 1989), 13.
64
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scorching of crops to the execution of an entire class is a stretch, but one which can show
the degree of desperation the leaders of the Revolution found themselves when trying to
claim historical justification for their violence.
These leaders of the Revolution who were enamored with the image of the Gauls
as the true ancestors of the French people were the Jacobins. The Jacobins were
proponents of patriotism, liberty, populism, and republicanism. This patriotic and
populist mindset contributed to their desire to associate Vercingetorix with the common
people. In their precarious situation, after having ousted a longstanding government, the
Jacobins found that it was to their advantage to “forge a sense of national identity for an
invented community of people who had little in common except a political bond and who
did not even speak the same language.” 68 In the eyes of the revolutionaries, the Gauls
could be brothers-in-arms to the people of France in this new age, ancestors who had
revolted against the forces of Rome just as the people of France revolted against the
royalty; “nationalism and the inheritance of revolution would bring them together.” 69
Nonetheless, the largest result of the Revolution regarding heritage involved the
changes in association connected to the different groups of ancestors; the Franks and the
Gauls. Clovis and his Franks had often been associated as a symbol of the nobility, with
the aforementioned connections to both the church and the aristocratic family lines. With
the Revolution’s prejudice towards both religion and status, there was a push to “[craft] a
new popular tradition out of the heritage of the ambivalent relationship between the
ancient Celts[Gauls] and their Roman conquerors.” 70 In this way, Rome would serve as a
model of limited Republicanism and Democracy, while the Gauls could provide “a better
potential foundation for an emotionally charged sense of ethnic community.” 71
Vercingetorix and the Gauls’ association as heroes had begun, and through the pushing of
their revolutionary status by the Jacobins, they slowly began to find themselves
connected to the common people. 72
As Napoleon I took power following the Revolution, he was aware of the
potential the Gauls could grant his budding empire. He began by “[furthering] the popular
republican tradition of Gallic identity by founding the Académie Celtique in 1805…The
task of this body of scholars was to exhaustively research Celtic antiquities and languages
in order to ‘avenge our ancestors’ for the neglect they had suffered…and to restore to the
Celts the glory they deserved.” 73 The political purpose of the Académie is easy enough to
guess at, and the tone in their chartered purpose makes it clear that they are looking to
Michael Dietler, "’Our Ancestors the Gauls’: Archaeology, Ethnic Nationalism, and the Manipulation of
Celtic Identity in Modern Europe," American Anthropologist, New Series, 96, no. 3 (September 1994): 587,
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inflate the Gallic legend by granting it scholarly backing. Given that, as the academy
stated, “’nearly all the peoples of Europe are descendants of the Celts’”, it was easy for
Napoleon I to claim “ideological justification of the military expansion of the boundaries
of the French Empire” in order to “’[reclaim] all the ancient territory of the Gauls’.” 74
While the Gauls served as glue to the cultural community of Revolution, Napoleon I used
these newly recognized ancestors as justification for the beginning of his military
campaigns with the support of his own academies.
However, Napoleon I would find defeat, just like his newly claimed ancestors. In
this way, the French people had their first direct parallel with Vercingetorix and the
Gauls. They were able to feel a distinct connection with Vercingetorix and began to
picture him as a “symbolic figure of the struggle against the invader” 75 as the Prussians
occupied Paris in 1815. This feeling of connection based on defeat would re-emerge in a
stronger sense multiple times throughout the history of the French. Nevertheless, in the
downtime following the fall of the French Empire, the Gauls would not have to take a
step backwards for long. The initial Revolution at the end of the 18th century had given
the Gauls the push that they needed to remain established in the thoughts and beliefs of
the French people. When the next Revolution came in 1830, it “permanently established
the Celts as a primary ethnic foundation for the modern French nation.” 76 The Revolution
of 1830 reinvigorated those previous associations and introduced the Gauls into the
national consciousness in a significant way, thus allowing the further developments that
would occur to their legacy throughout the rest of the long nineteenth century.
“United Gaul, Forming a single nation, Animated by the same spirit, Can defy the
Universe.” 77 This is the inscription embedded into the base of the statue of Vercingetorix
at the site of Alésia, placed there by Napoleon III, nephew of Bonaparte, first French
president, and emperor of the Second French Empire. In many ways, it serves to define
the entire construction surrounding Vercingetorix and the Gauls which is created by
Napoleon III during the second half of the long nineteenth century. The statue’s
inscription ends up “[telling] us rather more about 19th-century French nationalism than it
does about the 1st century BC.” 78 It articulates the growing sense of national pride that
built up around the legacy of the Gauls and Vercingetorix, rather than simply being a
plaque commemorating the site of their defeat. Viollet-le-Duc, the creator of the base and
the writer of the inscription, is commenting on this change in popular French belief and
cultural identity which was spurred on by his patron, Napoleon III. 79
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Napoleon III found himself in a unique situation after the Revolution of 1830.
Claiming power after his presidency ended in 1851, he established the Second French
Empire. Napoleon I, Caesar, and Vercingetorix are all possible symbols of legitimacy for
his new reign. However, they are rather contradictory figures, especially that of Caesar,
whose French legacy is directly tied to his defeat of Vercingetorix, himself “elevated to
semi-legendary status on the wave of Celtomania of earlier decades.” 80 Here is presented
the problem of the continuous debate in France between holding either Rome or the
Gauls in higher esteem. For most of the populace during the 19th century, “when leaders
such as Vercingetorix…had been adopted as nationalist icons, the Romans were seen as
conquerors---bloodthirsty oppressors. Those who resisted were elevated to totemic
status.” 81 Those who saw otherwise were mostly intellectuals who praised the lasting
contributions of Roman civilization.
In the end, Napoleon III took a note from his uncle’s legacy as he built his own.
Both Napoleon III and Napoleon I “wrote commentaries on Caesar’s wars, and both in
their way used Caesar as a means of bolstering their personal sense of Empire.” 82
Napoleon I had “clearly pitted himself as the equal of Caesar and his worthy modern
equivalent” 83, and had viewed Rome as the ancestor “of his aspirations for French
military conquest and the legitimacy of his own rule as emperor.” 84 In line with this
Napoleonic imperial tradition, Napoleon III also wrote extensive histories of Caesar’s life
“as a means of making him the patron of his emperorship.” 85 Despite this attempt to
channel his uncle’s legacy, there are clear differences to be seen in the relationships that
the two Napoleons held with Caesar. Generally, Napoleon III treats Caesar as a muse and
intellectual model, and instead utilizes Vercingetorix as his national hero and military
rallying point. It is not a stretch to claim that Napoleon III “celebrated Caesar…by his
quill, Vercingetorix by a statue” when one reads his devotion to Caesar’s history, noted
on the side of Vercingetorix’s statue at Alésia. 86
It was common in France for the upper class to see the Roman invasion as
beneficial overall. Napoleon III states it himself as a benefit which arrived “through
waves of blood, it is true”, but which nonetheless “delivered the people to a better
future…not [forgetting] that it is due to the triumph of the roman armies that [the French]
have [their] civilization; institutions, traditions, language, all this comes from the
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conquest.” 87 Many public works followed the style of the Romans, perhaps in order to
channel some measure of their reputation. 88 This practice initially began in France during
Napoleon I’s empire, but it was easily continued when Napoleon III came to power.
Channeling the legacy of the Romans in art and intellect certainly never fell out of
fashion.
Now that Napoleon III’s personal conflicts of interest are established, how exactly
did he develop his construction of Vercingetorix? He needed Vercingetorix to serve as an
icon for his Second French Empire, uniting the French and presenting a strong patriotic
front to the world at the same time. Caesar had presented Vercingetorix as the uniter of
the various Gallic tribes, 89 and Napoleon III intended to make the most out of this aspect
of Vercingetorix’s legacy. This method of fulfilling the purposes which the Second
French Empire needed was not so uncommon at the time, as multiple nations sought to
establish a sense of national pride. Indeed, “when a nation seeks to shore up a flagging
national image, it understandably canvasses the annals of its past for inspiration.” 90 It is
especially necessary for Napoleon III once one considers the reputation France found
itself carrying in the second half of the long nineteenth century: the defeated and humbled
ex-empire. Yet, one soon realizes the odd coincidence that has thus taken place. The
Vercingetorix that Napoleon III is enamored with, his “appealing emotional focus for an
emerging sense of unified nationality and class coherence”, 91 is an image of
Vercingetorix that arises from Caesar’s construction, built from Caesar’s writing.
Whether realized by Napoleon III or not, the construction of Vercingetorix as the uniter
of the Gauls comes from the Romans; this cultural veneer, in many ways, is a necessary
part of the construction. It obscures the Roman influence on Vercingetorix’s legacy, and
allows Napoleon III to have a French hero who models his cultural ideal of unity, as
written on the statue at Alesia. 92
Vercingetorix had entered the general awareness of the French populace during
the Revolution. His legend, however, was still very impressionable. Perhaps as a way in
which to help mold Vercingetorix’s legacy to be more welcome and closely connected to
the populace, “in 1864, the Académie française, the great national and official institution,
proposed a prize for poetry on the gallic hero.” 93 After this initial spark of interest during
the Second French Empire, there is little doubt that these works of art continued to
enlarge and influence Vercingetorix’s legacy. Not just in poetry and prose either, the
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artistic fields in general gradually became flooded with works dealing with Vercingetorix
and the Gauls following the initial burst. In sculpture alone, there were “over 200
sculptures of Gallic themes by over 130 artists during this period.” 94 Napoleon III’s
support of this goal is seen at the very least in his personal funding of the statue of
Vercingetorix at Alésia. The aforementioned inscription of the statue, as well as the
“distinct likeness” 95 its anachronistic features hold towards the young emperor certainly
affirm the direction which Napoleon III desired the artistic movement to take. This time
period in French art marked a popular “frenzy of Celtic identity and the rise of
Vercingetorix from” relative “obscurity to the status of a preeminent national hero.” 96
The success of the movement regarding Vercingetorix’s popularity became undoubtable
as artists likened him to other famous French icons.
Joan of Arc reigned as the most famous French hero for centuries. Holy martyr
and popular symbol of resistance to the age-old rival of Britain, she had long celebrated a
favorite spot in the hearts of the people. Now, as Vercingetorix rose to fame, she would
learn to share her celebrity, especially as many of her symbolic usages became more
strongly associated with the Gallic leader. Martyr, defender, stubborn resistance fighter,
Vercingetorix was quickly reaching the next level of popular recognition, his name
becoming “symbolic of patriotism, of indomitable courage, of heroic devotion.” 97 Do not
be mistaken, however. While they learned to share certain associations, Joan of Arc was
still a significant figure in the French mythology. The fact that the two were associated so
closely in this manner, often idealized in art and sculpture “[advancing] side by side,
hand in hand”, exemplifies the similar ideals they exemplified. While showing
Vercingetorix as an equal of the revered saint, this serves to also show them in a kind of
mentoring relationship, 98 where Joan of Arc is guiding the new hero on how to properly
execute his newfound role. It is extremely significant to Vercingetorix’s developing
mythos that he is counted alongside Joan of Arc, as it showcases his rising popularity and
place in the cultural zeitgeist of France. Soon enough, he would find himself “installed
solidly amongst the icons of the homeland, especially those future defenders and saviors,
Du Guesclin, Joan of Arc, the heroes of the Revolution and even Adolphe Thiers,” 99 and
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those associated closely with war, “grand patriotic figures” such as “le Grand Ferré or
Jeanne Hachette” 100 as the War of 1870 would show.
The War of 1870 brought Napoleon III to his knees. A decisive defeat at Sedan
and the subsequent occupation by the Prussians lead to a huge loss of public morale. In
order to understand the significance these events would have on Vercingetorix’s legacy,
one must first understand the parallels which are created by these events. Much as Alesia
fell before the Romans, leading to their occupation of Gaul, the defeat at Sedan and the
subsequent Siege of Paris gave the Prussians victory and led to their occupation of
France. Léon Gambetta, the French defender of Paris following Napoleon III’s capture at
Sedan, could be compared favorably to Vercingetorix, as he worked to maintain and
organize the French troops and administration that remained after Sedan into a somewhat
worthy national defense which faced their own Alesia-esque last stand in Paris. 101 These
parallels hit close to home, as popular opinion thought of Caesar more and more as a
“precursor to Moltke and Bismarck.” 102 In this way, “Alesia was assimilated into the
defeat of 1870,” 103 and became personally relatable to the French on the level of the
current defeats at Sedan and Paris. After all, it becomes much easier to connect to defeat
and occupation in one’s history when defeated and occupied oneself.
Before this had even happened, the French had always juggled their national
identity with their complicated history. The most important moments of their cultural
history are
divided into three well defined periods; and at the summit of each there appears a
grand figure who dominates all the others: ---In Antiquity, Vercingetorix; in the
Middle Ages, Joan of Arc; in modern times, Napoleon. ---Patriotism, faith, glory--and just as all those who are great are completed by adversity, like all the stories
with their ordeal---to Vercingetorix, a barbaric death in the dungeons of Rome; --to Joan of Arc the pyre at Rouen; ---to Napoleon, captivity at St. Helena. 104
Together, these three figures and the virtues they represent to the French people form the
most important building blocks of French cultural identity and national pride. French
nationalism undoubtedly is constructed through a combination of the three
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aforementioned virtues: patriotism, faith, glory. Yet as one can clearly see, the French
have a complex relationship with defeat at the same time. In one way, it acts as a morale
booster, that despite the setbacks and hardships present in the country’s history, France
still remains. Even after their defeat in the War of 1870, “republican intellectuals saw in
Vercingetorix the preservation of an essential element of national sentiment” 105; namely,
patriotism even in the face of defeat---a stubborn resistance against shame and
supplication.
The War of 1870 represents a sort of breaking point for the French as a people,
where they ultimately decide to pursue Napoleon III’s construction of Vercingetorix on
another level. Rather than succumb to defeat, they take inspiration from their national
history, and the legacy of their heroes. Their growing national sentiment of resistance,
and stubborn refusal to let it happen again leads to a new level in their proud
identification with those who resisted in the past, as “the Third Republic that was
established after this sees the further rise of Vercingetorix as a national symbol for the
French.” 106 Due to the French people’s newfound connection with the Gauls, their
opinion of Caesar and Rome in general became even more strained than before. To the
French, “Vercingetorix was the hero because he never submitted to Rome’s civilization
but preferred death instead. To have accepted submission to Rome’s benefits of
civilization would clearly have…implied that they should accept the shame of 1870.” 107
Caesar’s legacy gradually became diminished to only that of an invader, which helped to
disparage Rome’s connection to civilization in France. 108 France’s persistent will to
identify with their brave resistance fighter led to France finding “solace in
Vercingetorix’s profile of valor and dignity even in defeat” 109 as it emerged into the 20th
century. The Third French Republic would arrive back onto the world stage with a new
national self-image of defiance and resistance which would define the French zeitgeist in
the World Wars to come.
Thus, the French connection to Roman civilization begins to break down. This is
especially significant, and in some part is due, to the increase in German sentiment
regarding Rome. During the same period of time as France came to view Rome in a
different light, Germany had begun “championing…Roman aims and achievements. As
exemplification of this, Kaiser Wilhelm II encouraged the Limeskommission (1892), the
Saalburg reconstruction (1897-1907) and the Römisch-Germanische Kommission
(1902).” 110 These projects consisted of Roman excavations and research projects
undertaken by Germany in a similar manner to those undertaken at Alésia by Napoleon
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III under the Second French Empire. Both projects, but especially the Limeskommission,
which sought to determine the location of the northern Roman border, indicated the
“geographical determinist streak in nationalist thinking,” which soon would become
“particularly strong in relation to the Rhineland.” 111 As a response, the French sought to
diminish the legacy of the German ancestors who could be presented as equals to
Vercingetorix, such as Arminius and Tetricus. 112 Arminius especially was used by
Germany as a historical figure in a similar manner to Vercingetorix, having been
reintroduced to the populace as a model ancestor in order to strengthen national morale
and justify militaristic goals. National borders began to be attached to nation’s histories
more and more as they attempted to find justification for military actions or political
leverage. The idea of a larger Celtic nation especially attracted attention in France, as it
could “[legitimize] the drive to reestablish the ‘natural’ borders of France.” 113 These
arguments would escalate and eventually become a factor contributing to the causes of
World War 1.
Yet, the French did not only find cause for concern with their German neighbors,
but also with the direct descendants of Rome: the Italians. The low opinion the French
had fomented for Rome was easily transferrable to their direct descendants. Many of the
developments before and during the World Wars contributed to this as well. At the
beginning of World War 1, the entry of Italy into the Triple Alliance “aroused a lively
anti-roman reaction” as it brought together the cultural and ideological descendants of
Rome, which would be to the French “the worst European duplicity, the alliance of
Germany with Rome.” 114 The French people’s newfound disdain for Caesar and the
Romans developed into a general prejudice against Italians, which only “grew with the
addition of Italy to the Triple Alliance.” 115 All in all, the stance France took towards Italy
during the time is best summarized by French intellectual of the time, Emile Lambin;
“Republican Rome crushed us, Imperial Rome ruined us, Pontificate Rome betrayed us,
Royal Rome today has allied with our worst enemies.” 116 Even as they became eventual
allies in WW1, the re-alliance of Italy with Germany in WW2 likely reignited these
feelings in the French populace, especially as Mussolini celebrated Rome’s imperial
legacy.
While the connections between anti-Roman and anti-Italian sentiment in France
ought to be clear enough, the vehement stance the French take towards the Germans may
seem more unreasonable, thus requiring further explanation. As a recap, the French had
been defeated and occupied by the German’s recent ancestors, the Prussians, twice in the
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last century. As the French struggled to come to terms with these defeats and occupations
in the second half of the long nineteenth century, they leaned more heavily on
identification with the Gauls and Vercingetorix, who had exemplified resistance in the
face of the invader. Now, rather than Rome, the face of the invader was to be updated and
associated with the recent rivals of the French, the Germans. The French people’s
identification with Alésia and Vercingetorix came to be connected with “resistance to
invaders” in general, “be they Roman or German.” 117 Thus, in the larger scheme as
World War 1 began, Vercingetorix suddenly “stood for resistance to the new
Germany.” 118 Based on this “national aspect of Vercingetorix that [France] insisted to
renew,” Vercingetorix would find himself in a position like Joan of Arc once again,
having become like a patron saint, the ancestor of the French infantrymen fighting a
battle of resistance against the invader. 119 In France, this identification between French
infantrymen and the Gauls was a welcome one.
World War 2 presents many of the same parallels as World War 1. Fascists in
Germany and Italy alike welcomed identification with their Roman ancestry and glorified
those imperial roots. Swiftly after the war began, France found itself on the other side of
that Italian-German alliance once again. Besides these similarities, the country faced a
difficult reality and a national feeling it had not been forced to deal with since the War of
1870: defeat and occupation. After World War 1 had left France on the side of victory,
occupation especially came as a great shock and national cause of shame. Vercingetorix,
national hero, symbol of resistance to the invader, would not find himself on the sidelines
of the ideological war that raged on in occupied France. Vercingetorix would instead:
[continue] to be used as a national symbol, but in different ways by the radically
divided French political groupings. For Pétain and the Vichy government,
Vercingetorix was the hero who had sacrificed himself for Gaul –the hero in
defeat. Wartime propaganda put him at the head of a line of heroes, followed by
Joan of Arc, Henri IV, Napoleon – ending with Pétain. For the resistance and De
Gaulle on the other hand, Vercingetorix was ‘the first resistance fighter in our
history’, a national hero symbolising the throwing off of the German yoke. 120
Vichy and Free France represented two aspects of Vercingetorix, and of French history,
which had come to a head. Vichy France and their leader Pétain pushed the necessity of
maintaining French pride even in defeat and accepting occupation as a necessary
sacrifice. On the other hand, Free France and the French Résistance would continue to
push Vercingetorix’s aspect of defiance even in the face of overwhelming odds which
had placed him in the forefront of so many French hearts during World War 1. It is thus
no surprise that this is the side which won the ideological war in the end.
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Vichy France’s ideology of Vercingetorix pushed forward the spirit of
martyrdom; occupation as a necessary evil that had to be endured in order for France to
survive. Pétain, Vichy’s Chief of State and former World War 1 Marshal pushed the
ideals of “the necessity of sacrifice and underlined the permanence of the nation despite
some setbacks.” 121 The traditions of the myth of Vercingetorix myth could easily be
aligned by Vichy France to their purposes, twisting valorous defiance into apathetic
martyrdom. Throughout this period, notable sites in the mythology of Vercingetorix, such
as Gergovia, were especially popular with the leaders of these competing modern
ideologies. Rallies held there by Vichy France even “suggested Pétain as ‘nearly a
reincarnation of Vercingetorix’.” 122 The two leaders could indeed be compared by a
singular, important similarity. The connection that was pushed the most between Pétain
and Vercingetorix “had sacrificed himself to save the nation.” 123 Pétain was simply
emulating his Gallic ancestor, recognizing the wisdom of surrender for survival rather
than total annihilation for nothing. In this way, Pétain made his own attempt to craft
Vercingetorix’s legacy to his own purposes.
Free France and the French Résistance would offer their own interpretation at the
same time. Rather than his aspect of martyr, they pulled from his legacy of resistance.
With examples as close at hand as World War 1, they “exalted the will of fighting until
the end for national independence.” 124 Their image of Vercingetorix pressed for action,
even against overwhelming odds:
‘He dared to defy the enemy. This spirit of resistance to all oppression---that is
found in Joan of Arc as in the shadow of our combatants in the years 1940-1945--he is the distant promoter. He would chronologically be the first of the resistance
fighters of France’…Vercingetorix is evoked like a ‘hero who personifies
resistance’ to the ‘roman occupation’ and ‘the guerrilla wars of resistance fighters
harassing the baggage of the enemy’. 125
This image of resistance stands proud, with examples that parallel the realities that the
French Résistance would be facing. The legacy of guerrilla warfare and the harassment of
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baggage against a foreign occupier was an easy parallel to pull against Vichy France and
the Nazis.
Even so far as Gergovia is concerned, Pétain was not the only one to use the site
as a rallying point for their ideological goals. In fact, the irony of the site may not have
crossed Pétain’s mind. Gergovia was in fact “where Vercingetorix and the Gauls had
inflicted a defeat on the…invaders.” 126 Alésia, site of Vercingetorix’s defeat, may have
served Pétain’s purpose better. The site also served the French Résistance in their own
way, as “an archaeological dig there in 1940 provided cover for a resistance cell.” 127
Eventually, Pétain even laid off on his comparisons with Vercingetorix, given the French
Résistance’s success in utilizing his legacy. Some concrete evidence to this point lies in
“the fact that many of the 19th-century monumental bronze statues of Vercingetorix were
later melted down by the Vichy government, whereas those of Joan of Arc were not
touched, [which] suggests that Pétain eventually came to regard the symbol of
Vercingetorix as a threat.” 128 As the war came to a close, the image that prospered was
that which had been kept alive by the French Résistance, and which once again gave the
French people some mental protection from the shame that followed occupation.
In the years that followed, Vercingetorix would continue to serve as a national
icon and point of pride. Numerous politicians would continue to utilize the same historic
sites of memory as touchpoints through which they could attempt to channel the feelings
that had been gradually built into Vercingetorix’s legacy. Re-emerging onto the world
stage through the tumultuous changes wrought in the Revolution, molded in the hands of
two Napoleons in the afterimage of Caesar, and forged in the fires of the largest wars the
world had ever seen, Vercingetorix had finally reached the apex of heroism: unconscious
cultural identification.

Chapter 3
At the end of the World Wars, Vercingetorix’s legacy had become established in
the minds of the French people as an important part of their cultural identification. In the
years to come, this legacy would continue to be used in both well-worn and novel arenas.
On the traditional track, French politicians throughout the 21st century continued to call
back to the Gauls in similar ways as before the World Wars, using Vercingetorix’s
postwar cultural status in order to appeal to the general populace. On the other hand, with
the rise of decolonization and France’s imperial past, the legacy of the Gauls came to be a
significant part of ideological movements for colonial independence before, during, and
after the war, despite French attempts to establish a common Gallic heritage amongst all
their territories. This is particularly notable as Vercingetorix would be used on both sides
of these movements even before the postwar era, both as evidence for the ‘necessary
civilization’ of imperialism and said reinvigorated independence movements.
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Even past these complex usages, Vercingetorix’s legacy would find the most
recognition in the general cultural zeitgeist of France. His newfound heroic status, won in
the fires of the World Wars, placed the Gauls as the firm ancestors of the common
Frenchman. The educational system would further cement Vercingetorix’s mythos as the
French ancestor, implanting the notion into children at a young age. In both conscious
and unconscious examples, images and items relating to Vercingetorix were thus
plastered onto a variety of multimedia. Besides products and street titles, the bandes
dessinées (BD/’comics’) which were created in his image proved to be the most
influential method of keeping his legacy alive in the minds of the people. Astérix, the
most famous of these, is a cultural icon on par with Mickey Mouse in the Francophone
world. Vercingetorix’s influence has not stopped since. In 2012, a new museum dealing
with Alesia and the Gauls was opened at the site, which has encouraged and maintained a
large re-enactment culture, which in itself is telling. The impact of Vercingetorix’s
French collective memory was not slowed down in the slightest by the end of the World
Wars, and continues to heavily influence French politics, media, and both personal and
national cultural identification.
As the World Wars came to an end, De Gaulle was the first French politician in
the postwar era to directly recognize Vercingetorix. The leader of the Free French Forces
during World War II and first President of the Fifth French Republic afterwards, De
Gaulle had more than enough comparisons in his life to liken himself to Vercingetorix.
Like Napoleon I, Napoleon III, and Petain before him, he made the effort to do so at
specific and meaningful locations. Of three sites which have been utilized by French
politicians, Bibracte, Gergovia, and Alesia, De Gaulle chose Alesia. Perhaps he felt a
kinship with Vercingetorix, having himself been the leader of French resistance until only
recently. Or perhaps he felt a certain connection to the site of Vercingetorix’s defeat,
which could have been another possible parallel to his own story, given that Vichy
France was established almost immediately after the start of the war. Alesia remains the
site of the three which is identified with the least because of its association with defeat; in
general, politicians seem more willing to utilize sites of victory when running for office
themselves. Nonetheless, De Gaulle began a faithful pilgrimage to the site, “for many
years [visiting] the site on the anniversary of the battle.” 129 Like those before him, and
those that would come after, De Gaulle continued the trend of “[rooting] constructed
traditions of national collective imagination” at these sites, which would grant them
“special symbolic value.” 130 This practice allows them to channel certain historical
figures of their choice at a specific site, and attempt to convey “a sense of authenticity
and continuity” 131 through them.
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Alesia itself had been an important site in the Vercingetorix mythos for years
since Napoleon III’s initial archaeological interest. In fact, the statue which Napoleon III
had commissioned for the site went on a national tour when it was completed. As it
passed through French towns and reached its final exhibition at Alesia, “crowds flocked
to watch it pass, some apparently even genuflecting before it.” 132 The process almost
seems like a mock funeral for the Gallic leader. It certainly mirrors the public exhibitions
and final internment of the American presidential funeral trains of Lincoln and
Eisenhower, also popular and military leaders. The fact that Lincoln’s funeral train and
the exhibition train of Vercingetorix’s statue take place in the same year, 1865, is an
amusing coincidence. These exhibitions allowed many people in their individual
countries to personally identify with and remember these figures. But more importantly
in France’s case, it began the work which De Gaulle would continue, of connecting the
site of Alesia to French popular memory.
The second site which was chosen by postwar French politicians was Gergovia.
Known in the Vercingetorix mythos as the site of his victory over the forces of Caesar,
Gergovia is the site which carries the most positive connotation. Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing and Jacques Chirac, both President of France during different periods, 1974-81
and 1995-2007 respectively, came together in 1989 at the site in order to campaign for
Chirac’s run against the then-current President, François Mitterrand. Their speech
consisted of a call for “the continuance of French identity.” 133 Chirac perhaps
unabashedly attempted to accuse Mitterrand, placing him in the same general category as
the rest of his socialist party, which routinely calls for the reduction of nationalism. Yet,
this trait of his party was not completely followed by Mitterrand.
François Mitterrand called on his Gallic ancestors many times himself, at the third
site of political importance connected to Vercingetorix, Bibracte. While no battle had
taken place here, it was noted by Caesar as the site where Vercingetorix had united the
Gallic tribes and been declared leader of their armies. 134 It is thus not surprising that
Mitterrand used Bibracte over the other sites as he called for national unity in 1985, 135
just before the French institution of ‘cohabitation’ came into use; cohabitation is the term
for periods of time in which the president represents a different political party than the
majority of their parliament, and thus appoints a prime minister from the opposition.
Since Mitterrand’s example, it has become a common occurrence in French politics, and
a useful tool for French presidents. An effective method of splitting power between two
parties, its roots can be found in Mitterrand’s call for a France “of tolerance, of
republican democracy.” 136 Perhaps in light of the success he found there, Mitterrand
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would continue to strengthen Bibracte’s link to the national mythos. Over the years, he
would sponsor the creation of a museum and research facility at the site, along with a
footpath connecting the site to Alesia. 137 Mitterrand would even take the steps to state
that “Bibracte was the place where the ‘first act of our history took place’” as he
“declared it a ‘national site.’” 138 As the original site of the unification of the Gallic tribes,
this might not be such a stretch of a claim, but nonetheless carries quite a lot of
importance in this continuing age of nationalism and nation-state justification.
As nation-states continue to value sites and feelings which contribute to their
national mythos, these three sites are all significant not just to Vercingetorix, but to
modern France. Just as in the long nineteenth century with Napoleon III, nationalism
becomes connected to the land. Leaders throughout the world especially love to spur on
these connections through archaeological digs, which serve to produce material evidence
backing their claims. In the example of Napoleon III, who instituted the first
archaeological digs at Alesia among other sites, Mitterrand also provided funding for
archaeological research at Bibracte. 139 The importance of these projects were
acknowledged throughout French history. Mitterrand’s predecessor, Valéry Giscard
d’Estaing, stated in 1981, the last year of his presidency, that “today the French people
increasingly want to renew their individual or collective memory. And archaeology, with
its material and concrete evidence, constitutes an ‘objective memory’ of the life of a
people or civilization.” 140 When connecting these ancient peoples of Gaul to their own
realities through physical evidence, Vercingetorix truly comes full circle, in the words of
Albert Réville, 19th century intellectual, as the cultural hero who “fought and died not for
a canton, not for a petty realm, not for a dynasty, but pro patria, for the Gallic fatherland
which is still ours.’” 141 Archaeological digs based in such sites of import lend credence to
these politician’s efforts to strengthen the connection of the land to the Gallic national
mythos.
What then of connecting people to the legend of the Gauls when the land they live
in is not part of continental, European France, and never once saw a Gaul set foot there in
the first place? Then one comes to the problems of pre-war imperialism, the post-war
struggles of independence and France’s post-colonial legacy. While America is most used
to discussing the ‘white man’s burden,’ one might be tempted to name French
colonialism the ‘Gallic burden,’ given that while the French certainly viewed imperialism
as a civilizing mission, they primarily did so in reference to their own past. Given that the
Romans had conquered them and brought to the Gauls certain ‘necessary’ aspects of
civilization, the French viewed their own conquests in the same light. During the era of
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Napoleon III, who himself believed in the benefits of Roman civilization, this idea of
Rome improving Gaul by conquering it “served as a subtle and convenient rationalization
for expanding French hegemony in Indochina, North Africa, and other overseas locations,
while at the same time emphasizing, on the model of the Gauls, the wisdom and benefits
of native submission to this heir of the Roman Empire.” 142 Much like Gaul had done in
the past, it was in their best interest for colonies to submit to French conquest. France
thus gladly took up the mantle of bearer of civilization and thrust itself onto its colonies
with a personal image of undertaking “an educational role, a political role of integration
of all ethnic, regional and social minorities through the proclamation of their common
ancestors, who likewise justified this colonial conquest." 143 The French colonies would
thus learn from the Gauls, their common ancestors in the line of succession of
civilization. As the Romans had passed it to the Gauls, the French now brought it to their
colonies, thinking that these colonies might “through [France] attain an even higher status
in the future.” 144 By imitating their cultural forebears, the French desired to bring in a
new wave of civilized peoples, but most importantly, a wave of francophone and
gallicized peoples. This colonial wave of gallicization is most commonly referred to by
the most paradoxical phrase included in its curriculum: “nos ancêtres les Gaulois” (our
ancestors the Gauls).
Perhaps one of the most interesting and unique situations that arises from this
unconscious gallicization involving the phrase “nos ancêtres les Gaulois” occurs in prewar Algeria. French Algeria had long been a colony of France, and its territory was even
considered to be multiple official French départements (the closest comparison for
Americans might be counties). Algeria’s location directly across the Mediterranean also
contributed to a large number of French immigrants to the colony, whose descendants are
referred to as ‘Pieds-noirs’ (blackfeet). When the country was initially conquered by the
French at the beginning of the 19th century, the primary leader of resistance to the French
military was Emir Abdelkader (also written as Abd al-Qādir/Abd el-Kader/Abdul Kader).
He united a number of tribes in the area and conducted a successful campaign which saw
him the winner of a treaty which granted him control of a sizeable inland area of Algeria,
so long as he acknowledged French sovereignty. When the French inevitably broke off
the treaty, Abdelkader resumed hostilities by relying on guerrilla tactics, and was
eventually forced to surrender due to waning local support. Transported to France in
exile, he unexpectedly found a warm welcome at the hands of Napoleon III, and
eventually would live the rest of his life on French pension in Damascus. 145 As one might
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already be gleaning from this short summarization of Abdelkader’s life, here begins a
number of parallels and problems that shall be addressed.
However, context is necessary in order to understand the rise of Algeria’s
nationalist movements. The Algerian desire for independence, and their own national
pride, had risen in the beginning of the 20th century, especially as France undertook their
own various defeats in the War of 1870 and WW1. Even as WW2 loomed over the
horizon, Algerian nationalists began to find interest in the specific figure of Abdelkader
once again. In the first parallel to Vercingetorix, he re-emerged into the historical
limelight as an ancestor whose heritage might be venerated and treated as an example. 146
However, De Gaulle’s cabinet decided to adopt the legacy of Abdelkader at the same
time, in order to adopt him as a pro-French reconciliatory symbol to their most important
colony before his figure became fully integrated into the ideology of a resistance
movement. 147 This of course calls back to the previous discussion with some parallels as
to Pétain’s usage of Vercingetorix’s legacy in Vichy France versus those usages of the
French Résistance. It is nonetheless a unique situation which shows how both sides
“endeavored to use him as an important source of legitimacy in their struggles over
colonial rule…the emir was increasingly subject to competing claims that cast him either
as an Algerian national hero or a French one.” 148 Colonizer and colonized grappling for
ideological supremacy, their justification riding at least partly on the legacy of one dead
human, truly showcases the importance that is placed on historical background. For both
the French and the Algerians, the legacy of Abdelkader becomes “a symbolic resource or
‘semiotic weapon’ in the social and political conflicts within [their] society.” 149
Regarding the construction of a hero, one certainly begins to wonder whether
Vercingetorix’s or Abdelkader’s case is the path which is more likely to be expected.
The Algerian side of resistance had been raised in a French system, and it is likely
that they had been unconsciously gallicized themselves. This unconscious bias, this
influence on their thoughts, can be seen most evidently through the statements of one of
the leading activists, Ferhat Abbas, who called for “a statue of the emir, taking as his
model the veneration in metropolitan France of the ancient Gallic resistance leader
Vercingetorix.” 150 The Algerians were able to recognize the parallels presented by this
French ancestor which likely occupied a large part of their education, and apply it to their
own ancestral figure. Just as they learned of Vercingetorix’s defeat leading to the benefits
of Roman civilization, they could recognize that Abdelkader’s defeat “had paved the way
for the reinvigoration of Algeria,” and called out that they must, in the same manner,
“recognize the glory of our defeated ancestors.” 151 And, in a similar conclusion, they
must be honored through a permanent reminder of their presence and influence, a statue.
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While a fitting parallel to Vercingetorix’s own rise to national prominence, a key
issue remains. The Romans were not still around and in control of France as Napoleon III
began to venerate Vercingetorix. Whereas in Algeria, the French colonial government
was fully aware of the feelings of resistance stirring in the region and understood that
symbolic warfare might be a necessary step. They acted on this, quickly approving and
beginning the construction of a monument fitting their purposes 152 before the
independence movement could fully integrate Abdelkader into their ideological pool.
Their goals included co-opting Abdelkader “from resistance leader to friend of France to
exemplify how the colonized could eventually identify with the colonizing power.” 153
Abdelkader’s history of making treaties with the French for the survival of Algeria, along
with his period of exile in France lent some credence to these arguments, which the
colonial government gladly made use of. The monument that ended up being constructed
was intellectually strategic, “an eight-meter tower with a crescent on top, it bore the
Arabic and French inscription of what Azan (a pro-French scholar) had earlier called
[Abdelkader’s] political legacy: ‘If the Muslims and the Christians lent me an ear, I
would put a stop to their differences and they would become brothers again, inwardly and
outwardly.’” 154 This inscription is placed here purposefully by the colonial government in
order to quell certain aspects of resistance ideology by making Abdelkader a symbol of
pro-French reconciliation. It unconsciously calls back to the likely gallicized aspects of
the Algerian’s historical education by illustrating the two groups, Algerians and French,
‘Muslims and Christians’, as ‘brothers’. This continuing thread regarding the idea of
homogeneous French identification and ancestry was one which the French colonizers
especially wanted to keep intact. So much so that they even arranged for Abdelkader’s
grandson, Emir Sehel, to speak at the statue’s inauguration to the effect of “his
grandfather’s visions of a peaceful coexistence of the two religions, which contained ‘the
seeds of a Gallo-Islamic nation.’” 155 One of the French speakers even stated that many in
mainland France recognized Abdelkader as a “French ‘national hero.’” 156 Indeed, Gabriel
Hanotaux, French historian and statesman, wrote that he saw in Abdelkader “a new
Vercingetorix,” who “’like the Gauls of the old times, fought for his home, for his
religion, for his homeland.’” 157 Comparisons of the two ancestors were not limited to just
the Algerians, and the colonial government was fully aware of the import that historical
figures can grant to ideological movements. While further research is necessary, it is
likely that the unconsciously gallic educational systems instituted by the French colonial
government in Algeria served to strengthen these pro-French propaganda efforts.
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The French colonial government’s strategy to co-opt Abdelkader as a pro-French
figure of Gallo-Algerian reconciliation was a stretch of a position to take, but it hit home.
They correctly assumed that the Algerian resistance movement understood that
“commemorating the history of the ‘Algerian nation’ and its ‘heroes’ would be vital for
the success of Algerian nationalism” and that “the construction of a national
martyrology” was one of the movement’s “central elements.” 158 Of course, Abdelkader
was central to this construction due to his position as the first leader of Algerian
resistance against the French colonizer. 159 In the resistance movement’s ideological
structure, his heroic legacy was “coming to embody a tradition of anticolonial resistance
that the emerging national movement wanted to take up.” 160 Thus, while their intent and
strategy was spot on, the colonial monument of reconciliation did not boost the feelings
they wanted it to, and ended up being treated as equivalent to “a declaration of war on
their newfound national hero.” 161 The significance of national heroes such as
Vercingetorix and Abdelkader can be seen in this war of symbols which took place in
Algeria. Both sides understand the impact that historical legacies can have on the sides
people take in movements such as these, especially when they are connected to the past
and future of the nation itself.
In the aftermath of the statue’s inauguration, it could be said that its creation
spurred on Algerian resistance leaders to new heights in their efforts to align Abdelkader
with the Algerian people. The same figure who had compared him to Vercingetorix,
Ferhat Abbas, led the protestation in his newspaper, stating the “’hypocrisy, ‘falsehood’
and ‘bluff’ of the ceremony…[countering] the official representation of [Abdelkader] as a
French patriot with an image of the emir as an unambiguous and inalterable Algerian
patriot.” 162 He took his arguments to such heights that his newspapers were confiscated
by the French and had to be given out in secret. 163 Along with their rhetoric of resistance,
and calls regarding their own movements, the creation of the colonial, pro-French statue
pushed Abdelkader to the forefront of arguments based on a new ideological soapbox; the
seizing of their heritage by the French colonial government:
Let us tell them (the colonizers and collaborators): the memory of [Abdelkader]
does not belong to you. By trying to appropriate it, you are committing a new
sacrilege, but one that will not stand. For one cannot seize a hero as one seizes the
land of the Mitidja or Sétif, or as one falsifies elections or kills innocent people.
The memory of [Abdelkader] belongs to the people. It belongs to those who suffer
and fight for the people as [Abdelkader] fought for them. 164
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As shown in Abbas’ newspaper, the adoption of Abdelkader in relation to Algerian
heritage and people in general is another important parallel to Vercingetorix’s own
developmental history as a hero. The owning of personal and collective memory is
presented strongly here in Abbas’ newspaper, and can also be seen paralleled in the
adoption of the Gauls as France’s own ancestors. The level of fervor that rose among
Algerians, in part because of the resistance movement’s efforts, resulted in a failed bomb
attack on the pro-France monument by members of the same group that would eventually
begin the Algerian War of Independence in the aftermath of World War II. 165
Following the Algerian War and Algeria’s newfound independence from France,
Abdelkader remained a national hero. He had been compared to Algerian leaders on both
sides of the war, including Messali Hadj from the moderate PPA-MTLD party, 166 and
numerous martyred leaders of the FLN (the successful Front de Libération Nationale
[National Liberation Front]). When Abdelkader’s remains returned to Algiers amid great
fanfare in 1966, he was laid to rest “between Larbi Ben M’hidi (1923-57) and Mourad
Didouche (1927-55), two prominent leaders of the FLN killed by the French during the
first years of the Algerian Revolution.” 167 In an important act of commemoration, Algeria
thus completed Abdelkader’s own construction as a hero by aligning him directly with
the relevant modern martyrs. If France ever recovered a bone of their Gallic ancestor, one
could only imagine the pomp and circumstance the entire country would experience. And
yet, in a similar manner to Vercingetorix, Abdelkader was memorialized in many similar
ways beyond his re-entombment. First, and most surprisingly given the previously failed
bomb attack, the pro-France monument was allowed to remain. The pro-French
quotations were removed and replaced with a sign which related “the ‘machination’
behind the project and the fierce resistance it encountered,” as it has now been adopted
“as a monument to the ‘hero of Algerian popular resistance.’" 168 In a similar manner as
the French strategy, Algeria has re-co-opted the monument into a symbol of their
resistance to the intended piracy of their national figure. Second, following on promises
to establish a ‘proper’ monument to the emir once independence was secured, 169 in
contrast to the colonial monument, a “bronze equestrian statue of the ‘great resistance
fighter’ was unveiled by Boumedienne on one of Algiers’s most famous squares, the
former Bugeaud square, now named after the emir.” 170 Unveiled by Houari
Boumedienne, then head of the Revolutionary Council, later President of Algeria, in a
similar ‘successor’ method as French presidents mentioned previously, Abdelkader’s
statue in the Algerian capital symbolically replaced both the name and statue of his
French conqueror, Bugeaud. His re-entombment and statue in Algiers would serve to
secure Abdelkader’s physical presence in modern Algeria as the monument under the
statue would secure his ideological presence: “’If France made me choose either keeping
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all my property and living in submission or being free and poor, I would choose to be free
and poor.’” 171
In many of the same ways as Vercingetorix, Abdelkader came to light as the
historical ancestor best suited to represent the Algerian resistance movement. Both of
them had united the tribes of their people in order to fight off a superior invading power,
and yet both had met defeat with pride. Vercingetorix’s own legacy most likely
influenced the resistance movement’s idea of taking Abdelkader as an Algerian hero due
to the probable presence of gallic influences in the French education system and the spirit
represented by the phrase ‘nos ancêtres les Gaulois.’ In the modern era both of them were
celebrated through physical symbols of remembrance—monuments and statues in
significant locations—which serve to tie their legacies not just to the movements of the
present but to ideals of the future. Both sides in Algeria realized the importance of
national figures, and the symbolic importance that this “Algerian Vercingetorix” 172 could
grant to their respective ideas and movements. Abdelkader serves as an excellent, unique
example (and one not far from home for the French) to understand in another light the
extent of Vercingetorix’s influence as a French icon in the 20th century.
In both mainland France and its colonies, the educational system likely played a
large part in instilling this new-found identification with the Gauls into the hearts of
subsequent generations. The previously discussed notion of ‘nos ancêtres les Gaulois’
had further implications for French colonies, but especially regarding the mainland’s new
nationalist education system, Vercingetorix and the Gauls were very likely an important
aspect of the new historical syllabus. Following the War of 1870 and Vercingetorix’s
newfound place in the French zeitgeist, the French people wanted to ensure that their
children would understand his importance to their heritage. First introduced to French
school systems in the 1870s and 1880s, 173 books such as Ernest Lavisse’s Histoire de
France were meant to help guide a new system of “national identity formation” 174 in
French youth. The national heritage would begin with the Gauls and trace an unbroken
line through the Revolution into the present day. The cultural affinity that the French felt
at the time was also integrated into these children’s history books, as they were taught
how to “apply the significance of Vercingetorix’s defeat to their own lives.” 175 However,
Vercingetorix’s presence in the French educational system certainly does not mean that
the students become experts on his background; in a similar manner how American
students learn of the US founders, French students learn of the Gallic chieftain through
retellings of his myth. 176 Thus, throughout the decades, the majority of knowledge of
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Vercingetorix in the French populace gradually becomes distilled down to a hazy
acknowledgement of his relation to the common Frenchman, gained more through
common sayings and popular feelings of association than actual historical education. In
turn, this new level of recollection and identification starts to be utilized, both
consciously and unconsciously, in the new frontier of mass media.
French media, writ large, associates itself with this mythos of the Gauls and
general feeling that the educational system and ‘nos ancêtres les Gaulois’ encourage. The
French people only grew more closely attached to this notion in the post-war era, as
France became one of the major proponents of Anti-Americanization. In the wake of their
immediate loss in World War II, the creation of Vichy France, and then the loss of their
colonial empire in the years to follow, the government of De Gaulle was well aware that
their position as a world-power was diminished. As American products began to flood
into Europe in the coming decades, both French newspapers like Le Monde and the
French Communist party would take a particularly strong stance against them, which in
turn ingrained itself to a certain degree in French culture in its own way. The idea of
‘coca-colonization’ 177 presented a threat to the particular imagined ‘French’ way of life.
So, who do the newspapers and politicians turn to? Their ancestral figure of resistance to
outside invasion. Except now, the war is not physical but ideological. Anti-American
France’s hero would be a novel form of the Gallic chieftain: a cartoon one.
The hit bande dessinée (Franco-Belgian comics) series Asterix quickly spread
across the Francophone world. It was originally created to be a distinct competitor to
American comics, an “aesthetic rebuttal to Disney-fied Yankee hegemony.” 178 For
French speakers, Asterix has more than certainly grown to be an equal to Mickey Mouse.
While meant to present a competitor to the Mouse, Asterix was also to be uniquely
French. In the postwar era, the most immediate figure that was distinctly recognizable as
being a symbol of the French was Vercingetorix and the Gauls. Goscinny, one of the
strip’s creators, stated that when Uderzo and himself began, it was “to Vercingetorix that
[they] thought when [they] invented Asterix.” 179 Meant for children, the story of Asterix
is set in Roman Gaul, with the main character of the same name living in the last holdout
village against Rome, on account of their druid’s magic potion. With adventures covering
the scope of Europe, Africa, and even North America, Asterix has had a long and
successful run that continues into the present.
Besides commercial success, Asterix’s ideological popularity in the Francophone
world has allowed him to become an icon of France himself. Vercingetorix , one might
think, ought to be less important as time made the war grow further distant. As a
militaristic and nationalist figure, peacetime might not be a period which would see his
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legacy grow more popular. However, with the emergence of Anti-Americanization in
France, and Asterix presenting a more tolerable form for nationalism to manifest in
during peacetime, Vercingetorix would continue to find new avenues to expand his
influence. In many ways, Asterix can be said to be the new representative of
Vercingetorix’s legacy. Since the emergence of the bande dessinée, the stories have
“strongly contributed to returning to the Gauls the notoriety which they enjoyed in the
grand public. They reach print runs so exceptional that all French know at least the name
of Asterix.” 180 In this way, Vercingetorix’s ideals and associations would come to have a
new resurgence through his mass media proxy, Asterix. As Asterix was presented to a
new generation who had not engaged with Vercingetorix’s legacy in the same way as
their parents, parallels to his emergence in the long nineteenth century would reoccur, but
centered around mass media instead. One of these would be in the bande dessinée,
Taranis, a competitor strip to Asterix, who would continue the tradition of justifying
Roman conquest. The presentation of Rome in Taranis, and even in Asterix at certain
points, would prove a striking contrast to the simple villages of the Gallic main
characters. 181 In a more unique example, Asterix (the character specifically), generally
refuses to acknowledge the defeat which had occurred at Alesia throughout the strip, 182
and frequently defeats waves of Romans all on his own as if to prove this point.
One of the most important things that Asterix has achieved is the continuation of
the legacy of resistance which Vercingetorix represented in the French psyche throughout
the long nineteenth century and the World Wars. Partly due to its creation being
influenced by Anti-American feelings, Asterix has come to represent isolationist France’s
“determination to resist American imperialism” 183 and countered their “fear of cultural
corruption in the face of…global commercialism.” 184 Initially competing with American
comics, Asterix today continues to counter American media interests in France in terms
of film. Asterix’s new movie release in 1999 of Asterix and Obelix Against Caesar was
considered by Le Monde (a major French newspaper) to be a “ national matter of the
highest importance.” 185 The success of the movie would be symbolically tied to France’s
own success as a commercial country.
Yet, even as Asterix took Vercingetorix’s associated ideals to new battlefields, the
cartoon Gaul seems to eclipse his inspiration. Much like Superman came to epitomize the
‘American way’ in US comics, Asterix began to epitomize the Gauls. Current French
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President Emmanuel Macron has even compared Asterix to “the French way of life, a
world where the bounty of the word and table has pride of place, but so do solid values:
altruism, faithful friendship, struggle and togetherness. His image of the Gallic banquet is
its most dazzling portrait: fine food and beautiful union under infinite stars.” 186 The
French have come to associate themselves more closely with the Gauls through Asterix’s
depictions of Gallic life. Asterix has served to strengthen the ties which the French pull
between themselves and their Gallic ancestors, moving past Vercingetorix’s legacy and
creating links all his own. In this way, Asterix has come to surpass his inspiration:
As Vercingétorix and Astérix seemingly merge into a hero for all seasons and
reasons, ‘le phénomène’ Astérix continues to acquire layers of signification
making Astérix a veritable ‘lieu de mémoire’ in his own right. Viewed by many
as the ‘alter ego’ of the French people, Asterix has come to embody familiar
French reactions, behaviors, and attitudes in the form of ‘the Astérix complex’ or
‘le symptôme Astérix.’ 187
Asterix, as described here, becomes the ideological embodiment of the overarching
French aesthetic. As far as personal identification and mass media, he has come to wield
his own cultural influence apart from that of Vercingetorix. In the wake of the Charlie
Hebdo terrorist attacks, Asterix’s creator, Uderzo, contributed to the new outpouring of
French cultural nationalism in response to fear, through a drawing of the figure stating
that “Moi Aussi Je Suis Un Charlie!” (I am a Charlie too!) 188 Besides the rhyme present
in the French, it shows that Asterix’s creator is more than cognizant of the cartoon’s role
as a representative of the common French people.
Images and representations of Vercingetorix and the Gauls are rampant in
physical form across France, not just in mass media. The Gauloises cigarettes are a
recognizable example, both in name and image (the packaging has a Gallic winged
helmet). Numerous street names have associations tied to his legacy, whether directly
‘Vercingetorix’, sites of importance like ‘Gergovie’, or even ‘Place des Gaules’. 189 The
Paris Métro has a station named in the same vein, ‘Alésia’. There are even air ducts in
Paris “shaped like a Gaul in a winged helmet.” 190 Asterix, in constant competition with
Disney, has its own Parc Astérix, with a Celtworld follower in Ireland. 191 In tabletop war
games and online video games, Vercingetorix and/or the Gauls are constant inclusions for
the Roman era, most notably in the Total War series. In heavy metal, many European and
Celtic bands have tribute songs relating to Vercingetorix or one of his sites of
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importance. To contrast, classical music has also seen a resurgence of interest relating to
the carnyx, an ancient Gallic instrument used in ceremony and war alike. These serve as
but examples of the length to which Vercingetorix and the Gauls have entered into a
subconscious realm of awareness and association both in France and without.
One of the most notable of these examples would be the creation of the
MuséoParc Alésia in 2012. In a way completing Napoleon III and De Gaulle’s missions
of association, the museum constructed at the site of Alesia serves to officially note the
national site and make it fully legitimate. All it took was about 160 years of cultural
association, a decade of construction, and around “seventy-five million Euros” [60
million pounds/88.275 million dollars] worth of intent. 192 The epitome of modern
construction and presentation, the museum’s shape itself is that of a circle, calling back to
the siege lines constructed around the site by Caesar over 2000 years prior.
Encompassing the new museum building, the nearby ruins of the Gallic oppidum,
Napoleon III’s statue, and their own reconstructions of a section of the Roman
fortifications, the MuséoParc has certainly lit a fire underneath the French mythos.
Aspiring to be a “museum of mentalities,” the MuséoParc’s intent seems to be in line
with the European Union’s goal of détente, demilitarization, and the rejection of
nationalism. 193 Yet, while its exhibits and displays endeavor to explain the background
behind Vercingetorix’s myth, reversing a cultural association of nearly two centuries ends
up much harder in practice. Rather than as a place of revelation and understanding, it is
more commonly associated with, and sold online as, a tourist attraction based around its
reenactments. Besides organized demonstrations of Roman and Gallic tactics and fighting
techniques done in the museum and the recreated camp, they also host these larger events
done between enthusiasts. These entail recreations of battles between Roman soldiers and
Gallic warriors, done with wooden and foam weapons seen more often among ‘LARP’
groups. However, given that the majority of people at these events are more likely to be
spectators than participants, it lends support to the idea that the culture of reenactment
itself is connected to a certain degree to how people see their ancestors. In order to
partake in the first place, reenactment first necessitates identification, and pride above all.
Without these things, it would at the very least be lackluster for the crowds which gather
to watch. The MuséoParc is anything but. The reenactments and recreated fortifications
are popular among children and adults both, and “does nothing so much as fan an interest
in warfare.” 194 Vercingetorix’s legacy is thus enflamed in the hearts of the French who
visit the museum, whether in the adults who know the myth already, or the children who
learn of it through reenactors at the site itself. The easiest way to teach and instill a
certain view of history into children, after all, is to make it exciting.
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From pre-war colonial movements to the post-modern museum, Vercingetorix has
permeated French culture and politics. In this age of re-emerging nationalism and ethnic
conflict, perhaps he will be recalled again as a rallying point for the French. Yet, even as
his legacy is twisted and adapted to new situations, the associations attached to his legacy
remain constant. The Gallic chieftain fights against the invasion of France, whether
physical or ideological, and unites the French together, thus making them stronger in said
fight. Building connections to the common French people through Asterix and
consistently representing a bastion of French pride, Vercingetorix and the Gauls are
deeply engrained in French identity.

Conclusion
As a beginning, the first chapter laid out Vercingetorix’s origins in Julius Caesar’s
Gallic Wars. These journals of Caesar’s are enormously important to any work regarding
Vercingetorix, given that they are the only written ‘facts’ known about his life. ‘Facts’ in
quotations because Caesar’s construction of Vercingetorix is just that: his own creation.
While the information Caesar feeds the reader may be more true than false, it is important
to understand that these historical ‘truths’ are manipulated by Caesar to serve his
purposes. Caesar makes out Vercingetorix to be an equivalent, worthy, and dangerous
opponent. By doing so, Caesar is able to justify his military campaigns to the Senate and
people of Rome. But why is this significant? Because this construction of Vercingetorix
created by Caesar is the image and source of the meanings which become attached to him
by Napoleon III in the future.
The second chapter demonstrates how Caesar’s construction is utilized by premodern French governments throughout the long nineteenth century. Napoleon III
especially pushed the practice of these meanings transferred from the Gallic Wars, such
as pride and resistance, to the forefront of Vercingetorix’s myth. By being utilized as a
national symbol, and through his new popularity in the world of art, the idea of his legacy
would begin to be transferred to the common people of France. With helpful ties in these
artworks connecting the Gauls and Vercingetorix to pre-existing heroes such as Joan of
Arc, Napoleon III’s goal of identifying Vercingetorix as a national rallying point for the
people would be strengthened tremendously.
The French experiences in the War of 1870 and World War II, rather than
weakening Vercingetorix’s newfound connection to the French people, would actually
serve to strengthen it. Associations of defeat during the War of 1870, and the
establishment of Vichy France during World War II presented parallels to the Gallic
experience of defeat at Alesia and the subsequent Roman occupation. These parallels
would push the French people to more closely—consciously and unconsciously—identify
themselves with the Gauls.
The third chapter elaborates on how Vercingetorix’s legacy is developed
throughout the twentieth century and into the present. Firstly, that the idea of
identification with the Gauls was not just limited to mainland France. The French
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education system’s newfound emphasis on the Gauls likely contributed to the
gallicization of French colonies as well. The French government pushed a common
Gallic history in classrooms, which resulted in the French ideal of ‘nos ancêtres les
Gaulois’ being applied unanimously to both mainland and colonial France. As seen with
Abd-el-Kader, this resulted in the creation of colonial heroes whose meanings mirrored
those of Vercingetorix.
Vercingetorix’s ideals eventually come to be applied to the realm of media in
France, as the battlefield of soft power replaces that of the physical, militaristic one.
America’s commercial strength in the postwar world would prompt the response of
French newspapers and businesses, who needed competitors of their own to retain a
French presence in the world of commerce (and thus influence). As an opponent of
American soft power, the bande dessinée Asterix would be created with Vercingetorix’s
ideals in mind. In time, the titular character Asterix would become so popular in the
Francophone world that he would head a thriving media presence. This presence would
strengthen and continue the identification the French people held towards Vercingetorix
and the Gauls as ancestral, relatable figures. The creation of the MuséoParc Alésia in
2012 offers support to these claims, as its celebrated culture of reenactment paints the
Gallic warriors in an exciting and captivating light.
As shown by these three chapters, Vercingetorix is the most significant symbol
which has contributed to the development of French nationalism and identity. The ideals
which are included in his legacy have remained unchanged throughout the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries: resistance, self-sacrifice, and pride. Across these times, the majority
of French leaders have utilized Vercingetorix’s legacy to create a rallying point for the
French people. In turn, these consistent usages have cemented Vercingetorix’s place as a
national icon and hero. But most importantly, it has resulted in the unconscious
identification of the Gauls and Vercingetorix as French ancestors.
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